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Introduction  
This article aims to provide an answer to the following question: in an unstable economic 
context marked by rapid and profound technological changes, repeated financial crises and 
increasingly strict environmental constraints how can organisations and territories 
contribute to the maintenance of a high level of innovation while at the same time adapting 
to this turbulent environment? Answering this question pre-supposes the development of 
an analytical framework which will allow an understanding of both the adaptive ability of 
companies to innovate and the capacity of territories to favour this capacity. The concepts 
of organisational resilience and territorial resilience seek to take account of these 
phenomena.  
  
The theoretical framework which we are trying to build, based on existing studies  (Hassink, 
2005; Swanstrom, 2008; MacKinnon et al., 2009; Pike et al., 2010), should allow us to 
understand how organisations, markets, technologies and territories evolve together in an 
open and unstable economic climate. Resilience is a notion seeking to capture the 
differential ability of places to react and respond to uncertain, volatile and rapid change 
(shocks including financial crises, climate change, extreme weather events) (Pike et al.,  
2010). For Boschma, Van Oort and Balland (2011), economic territorial resilience is the 
“capacity to resist unfavourable events by absorbing negative effects and maintaining its 
path” (p.4). But they add that resilience also has a more progressive character because it 
includes the “capacity to evolve more radically, by building a ‘new’ path upon existing 
resources” (p.4). The common thread of all these definitions is to see the phenomenon of 
resilience as a response to an external shock. But few studies explore the case where the 
changes are profound but progressive, of a more incremental than radical nature: this is the 
first theoretical gap that this article attempts to fill.   
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Certain authors have started to explore the determinants of resilience. Thus, Bristow (2010) 
explains that this resilience depends on a few key elements: the diversity of activities, power 
being dispersed between numerous actors, mutually interdependent companies (as within 
a supply chain) or economic activities being integrated in local social networks. For other 
authors, resilience depends on the existence, within a territory, of a large number of small, 
innovative companies forming part of networks (Grabher, 2009). The accent is also placed 
on the necessity of recombining knowledge in order to go beyond traditional technological 
fields and develop new ones, thus opening up pathways for development (Suire, Vincente, 
2010).  
On the basis of these studies, three categories of determinants may be observed:  
- technological diversity, transversality and recombination have an influence on 
processes of Territorial Resilience. In particular, related variety would seem to be a 
determining factor (Boschma, Van Oort, Balland, 2011): it expresses the idea that 
the greater the number of traditional, but technologically related companies to be 
found in a territory, the greater the probability that the territory will see new 
industries developing. This is, for example, the case when comparing the traditional 
aeronautical industry with the new on-board systems industry which covers the 
aeronautical sector, but also space, automobiles and railways;  
- the structural properties of the networks are also an essential factor in resilience. 
Thus, the capacity of a network to allow its structure to evolve while avoiding lockin 
phenomena is crucial. In the same way, in relationships involving exchange of know-
how a centre/periphery structure seems to favour resilience (Suire, Vicente, 2010);  
- the third major category of determinants of territorial economic resilience is found 
in the role, the strategy and the position of companies, research centres and 
institutions. Competitiveness clusters, local authorities and pivot firms appear to be 
central to resilience. They activate the relationships necessary to the recombination 
of know-how by favouring links between a variety of participants by, for example, 
managing value chains (Kechidi, Talbot, 2010).  
  
This study is part of the analysis of this third category of determinants of resilience: we have 
chosen to examine the actors and the links which they form between them within a territory 
in order to successfully develop territorial resilience. In other words, we wish to put as much 
emphasis on those who act as on the results of their interactions. The first level of this 
analysis is that of the company, i.e. the micro-economic level, whereas the second is from 
the meso-economic point of view of the interactions between the different actors in the 
territory under consideration. We focus our analysis on a particular type of actor, that we 
call pivot firms (Cagli et al., 2009; Gilly et al., 2011; Kechidi, 2013; Talbot,  
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2013). These are firms which have the technical and organisational capacity to coordinate 
a network of actors. For a given territory they are the key actors. There again, few studies 
attempt to link the organisational and territorial dimensions of resilience: this is the second 
theoretical gap that this work attempts to fill.   
In order to do this, we develop a conception of resilience based on two dimensions:  
- an organisational dimension which refers to the capacity of an organisation to 
manage a disturbance to its environment and to develop a new pathway;   
- a territorial dimension which refers to the collective capacity of the actors to 
contribute to and to facilitate the development of territorial responses to external 
disturbances.  
  
We intend to show in this article that taking into account the two dimensions – 
organisational and territorial – simultaneously in the analysis allows the construction of a 
new approach to resilience. More precisely, it is a question of understanding how certain 
key organisations, in this case the pivot firms, contribute to the process of territorial 
resilience and, ultimately, why some regions resist and adapt better than others to shocks 
stemming from their environment.   
The development pathways of territories and the organisations (including firms) located 
within them are not necessarily synchronised. However it is not possible to have dynamic 
firms in a territory that is not dynamic, and vice-versa. We wish to underline the fact that 
there is inevitably a dialogue between the development pathways of a territory and those 
of the actors within that territory.  
  
This paper is essentially conceptual  – an attempt to shed light on the links between 
organisational and territorial resilience through a focus on the pivot firm - organised in three 
parts. In the first part, we explain the organisational dimension of resilience. In the second 
part we explain the territorial dimension. In the third part, we deal more particularly with 
one type of actor, the   pivot firm, which illustrates this double dimension of resilience.  
  
  
1. Organisational Resilience   
For numerous authors (Meyer, 1982; Weik, 1993 and 1999; Hamel, Välikangas, 2003; 
Hollnagel, 2006; Boin and McConnell, 2007), organisational resilience is the ability of an 
organisation to overcome an internal1 or external shock and to return to a stable state. For 
                                                     
1 For example, the accidents to Challenger and Columbia are considered to result from internal events related 
to the organisation of NASA, to its decision-making system, to its learning methods, etc. (Vaughan, 2005; 
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Altinas and Royer (2009) resilience is explicitly the “capacity of an organisation to maintain 
or return to a dynamic stable state which allows it to continue its operations during and after 
a major incident or in the presence of a continuous stress” (p. 267). The factors leading to 
resilience are: the setting up of systems of centralisation of authority (Barnard, 1938; 
Hermann, 1963; Meyer et al., 1990), to the rationalisation of the management of financial 
and human resources (Huy, Mintzberg, 2003; Meyer et al., 1990), to the development of 
new marketing strategies, to innovation or to the diversification of the range of activities of 
the company (Meyer, 1982).  
In these approaches, resilience is relative to the ability to resist and to manage a disturbance 
of the environment. They equate resilience to an organisational slack which cushions and 
absorbs external shocks (Meyer, 1982). Organisational resilience is seen mainly as the ability 
to resist an external shock and to overcome it. Only one component of organisational 
resilience is analysed, i.e. capacity for resistance. This is a view which does not adequately 
take into account the capacity of an organisation to anticipate and to create new 
development pathways. Now, “in a turbulent age, the only dependable advantage is a 
superior capacity for reinventing your business model before circumstances force you to” 
(Hamel, Välikangas, 2003, p. 2). We consider organisational resilience to be a double 
capacity of resistance and adaptation opening the way for new pathways. These pathways 
indicate the capacity of an organisation to find novel responses to new questions and not 
simply to reproduce previously-used organisational responses.  
  
  
1.1 Organisational resilience: a dual capacity of the organisation  
When analysing resilience, the notion of an “event” occupies a central place. This event is 
generally a shock, i.e. a discontinuity or a break with an existing situation in technological, 
organisational or market terms (Pauchant, 1988; Boin, 2005; Altinas, Royer, 2009). This is 
the case of a crisis or of any other major, unanticipated event. An external event may also 
take the form of a continuous process of change in the environment of an organisation. 
Such change is not then expressed by a shock but by a repeated pressure from 
environmental factors (market dynamics, behaviour of current or potential competitors, 
speed of innovation, etc.). The impacts of these two types of events are obviously not the 
same. In the first case, the organisation reacts to its environment. In the second, the events 
are anticipated and integrated.   
Organisational resilience refers to a double capacity: that of resisting a shock or limiting its 
effects but also that of anticipating and thus adapting to this shock or to a rapid evolution 
in the economic context by creating new systems, particularly organisational ones. Such a 
                                                     
Farjoun and Starbuck, 2005). In the remainder of this paper, we will confine ourselves to disturbances from 
the external environment.  
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capacity pre-supposes that the organisation has a certain number of skills, seen here as a 
set of resources mobilised in order to resolve a complex problem or a hitherto unknown 
production problem. Organisational resilience takes into account the existence within an 
organisation of two categories of skills: on the one hand, skills related to managing an 
external event (crisis management) and, on the other hand, skills relating to technical and 
organisational innovation in order to go beyond the crisis and to open a new pathway 
towards expansion.   
Thus we adopt the point of view according to which “resilience refers to a capacity for 
continuous reconstruction. It requires innovation with respect to those organisational 
values, processes and behaviours that systematically favour perpetuation over innovation” 
(Hamel, Välikangas, 2003, p. 4). Thus an organisation is resilient when, faced with 
continuous or discontinuous environmental pressure, it has the capacity to absorb and/or 
anticipate these mutations by developing a new growth dynamic. At this point the question 
of the nature of these capacities must be posed.  
  
1.2 The foundation of organisational resilience: the skills of the organisation  
Numerous studies find the basis of these capacities in the quality of the skills available within 
organisations. These skills are made up of the knowledge and know-how of the individual 
members of the organisation but also by the knowledge and practices held in the 
organisation’s memory. Cooke (2010) gives a good example of the resilience of 
organisations when he talks about Silicon Valley companies after the bursting of the Internet 
bubble in 2001. These companies were able to develop new products because they had, in-
house, the necessary skills to produce new, even unexpected responses to external shocks. 
For Hill et al. (2008) individual skills are the basis of a form of organisational resilience. Thus, 
they show that after the recession in 2000, centres specialising in computer services 
produced better results than those in the manufacturing industry because of their highly 
qualified workforce.   
These two examples, and there are many others, indicate clearly that in order to understand 
the resilience of a region, of the territory where companies are established, it is necessary 
to examine the companies themselves and the responses which they develop in the face of 
a turbulent environment. These organisational responses are based on the distinctive skills 
of the organisation, those which allow it to respond to shocks or recurring pressure from 
environmental factors which lead others to fail and disappear.  
  
Weick (1990; 1993) and Weick and Roberts (1993) offer a cognitive approach to 
organisational resilience. For these authors, individual and collective learning are the origin 
of the development of a collective memory for the organisation. This memory is made up of 
the totality of the knowledge, know-how, procedures, standards, and operating methods of 
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the activity and the organisational systems and the forms of interaction between its 
members. This memory can allow an organisation to find technical and organisational 
responses when confronted with an event which is potentially disturbing to its activity.  Riolli 
and Savicki (2003) add that if the factors contributing to organisational resilience are strongly 
influenced by the nature of the learning acquired by the organisation (all of its knowledge 
and know-how) they are also strongly influenced by the nature of the methods of 
coordination that it puts into place. With the concept of "resourcefulness" MacKinnon and 
Derickson (2013) also stress the relational character of resilience, which refers to the ability of actors 
to establish interactions in order to develop learning 2 . Modes of coordination structure 
relationships between individuals as well as those between organisations. Their nature will 
have an impact on the contents and the form of these relationships. Two complementary 
modes of coordination may be observed in a company (Talbot, 2010). The first aims at the 
acquisition, the conservation and the transmission of knowledge, representations, know-
how, experiences, etc. The second seeks to give coherence to contradictory aspirations, to 
regulate latent conflicts, to prioritise problems, to impose arbitration, to establish 
compromises. In effect, within a company, resilience pre-supposes that the actions of groups 
with different statuses and interests (shareholders, directors, employees, trade unions) 
articulate one with another. Beyond the sharing of knowledge, the existence of a 
compromise between the different stakeholders in the organisation is necessary in order to 
generate organisational resilience.   
Thus, finally, it is the nature of the knowledge acquired by an organisation, (i.e. its cognitive 
capital), and the specificity of its mode of governance (i.e. its nature and its quality), which 
form the basis of the resilience of an organisation.   
Thus, when faced with an external event which manifests itself in a discontinuous or 
continuous way, an organisation will develop two types of response depending on the 
nature of its internal skills and of its modes of coordination. We formulate two proposals 
concerning the behaviour of the organisation:   
- Proposal 1: the organisation possesses sufficient information and knowledge to deal 
satisfactorily with the uncertainty relating to its activity. This uncertainty is then 
“absorbed” by the compatibility of the response with the event which triggered it. 
The organisation does not need to innovate in order to respond to such 
disturbances. The uncertainty is stabilised by the set of existing organisational 
systems (information systems, monitoring systems, organisational procedures, etc. 
and modes of governance). In this case, the response measures the aptitude of an 
organisation to deal with disturbances to its environment without incurring new 
cognitive costs;  
                                                     
2 We  completely  agree  with  the authors  that  one  must  be careful  when  importing  a  concept   
– such as resilience  –  first developed in the life  sciences  into social  relations. For us, resilience  is  
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- Proposal 2: The organisational memory is insufficient to deal with these 
circumstances and the uncertainty is not “absorbed”. The organisation does not hold 
all the information or knowledge necessary for the response: the organisation must 
develop a new, original response. Two situations are then possible. Either the  
                                                                                                                                                                                  
not the return to the state of equilibrium  that existed before a  perturbation (ecological viewpoint). 
A system  is resilient  when it moves to a qualitatively new state,  when it moves into a new 
development pathway. However, it seems to us  that the problem  they  address  is  the  normative,  
political  and  ideological  use  of  such  concept  by  authorities and government actors.  This is not, 
however, our approach.   
  
organisation possesses the in-house skills which will allow it to develop new 
technical and organisational responses and to develop new directions of growth 
(overcoming the crisis). Or it does not have these means and its survival is called into 
question. The organisation may also seek, through external cooperation, for 
example located in the same territory, the skills which it lacks (see below). Whatever 
the situation, the nature of the response depends on the nature of the skills within 
the organisation.  
  
  
In the end, organisational resilience is based on the nature and the quality of collective skills, 
skills which are the basis for two abilities:  
- that of absorbing, anticipating and resisting an external event;  
- that of generating new technical and organisational solutions when faced with 
hitherto unknown technical and organisational problems.  
  
In the case where an organisation makes up for its lack of knowledge through cooperation, 
it must use relationship skills in order to join networks of actors which are non-spatial 
(global) and/or within territories (local networks). What becomes important in this 
situation, beyond complementary skills, is the existence of trust between the actors, 
common representations, shared and accepted rules, similar values (Colletis, 2010). This 
relates to a specific mode of governance which allows this opening towards new 
relationships. In the situation involving a network within a region, the company becomes 
part of a system of local interactions governed by rules between participants with 
complementary skills linked by the sharing of a common space, a common objective: for 
example a production-related project. It is within this context that we can consider that 
organisational resilience contributes to territorial resilience.   
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2. Territorial resilience   
According to Grabher (2009), in order to understand the phenomenon of territorial 
resilience, it is necessary to call on three principles: (1) the localised nature of innovation, 
(2) the life cycles of firms, industries and regions, (3) the role of institutions and 
socioeconomic culture. For Simmie and Martin (2010), territorial resilience is an “adaptive 
capacity” specific to a territory: “[…] it is the differential ability of a region’s or a locality’s 
firms to adapt to changes and shocks in competitive, market, technological, policy and 
related conditions […]” (p. 29). From this point of view, we take territorial resilience to be 
the ability of a territory to regain a dynamic state and to find a new pathway after a major 
perturbation in its environment. This territorial resilience is the result of the collective ability 
of the actors from the territory to build a response in order to resist external events, be it a 
sudden crisis or a marked change in the productive and technological context. This ability 
includes that of being able to absorb the impact of this event. Thus, organisations’ own 
capacities for resilience contribute largely to the outcome of the process of territorial 
resilience. This conception of territorial resilience is linked to a specific definition of the 
notion of territory.  
  
2.1 Territories: agglomeration territories, specification territories   
The notion of territory that we propose is meso-economic and may be understood in terms 
of proximity. One can speak of a territory when three types of proximity (organisational, 
institutional and geographical) operate together. Institutional proximity equates to the 
“rules of the game” accepted by the actors and which characterise territorial governance. 
These rules define the role of each participant and allow the convergence of representations, 
standards, values, etc. Organisational proximity is a potential for cooperation based on the 
complementarities of skills that is revealed by institutional proximity and depends on the 
problem to be resolved (Gilly, Torre, 2000). It opens the way for technical-productive 
relationships of actors within a value chain, an innovation process, etc.   
Institutional and organisational proximities are potential factors whose existence conditions 
the reality of a relationship between actors. This is not the case with the third type of 
proximity (geographical proximity): a relationship can obviously exist between actors who 
are physically remote from one another i.e. without geographical proximity. Geographical 
proximity can destroy a relationship by proving to be a source of conflict (cf. conflicts of use). 
But it can also reinforce it and help it to last. In effect, geographical proximity facilitates face 
to face interactions and thus facilitates exchanges. In particular, face to face communication 
facilitates the diffusion and recombination of heterogeneous knowledge and reduces the 
opportunism of the participants (Boschma, 2005). And Kechidi and Talbot (2010) remind us 
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that face to face communication allows new problems to be dealt with and resolved when 
none of the participants taken in isolation would have the capacity to do so.  
These combined proximities thus constitute a potential which, if it is activated by the 
interplay of the participants, reveals the existence of a territory (Gilly, Torre, 2000). One can 
distinguish two extreme categories of territory:    
- on the one hand, the agglomeration territory which refers to a spatial concentration 
of heterogeneous actors and activities. The agglomeration creates technological 
externalities that companies can seek to capture by gathering near the source of 
these externalities (Krugman, 1995). Holding non-complementary resources and 
being part of a system of weak territorial governance, these actors maintain classical 
market-based relationships and do not try to coordinate their activities with the 
objective, for example, of collectively producing a new technology;  
- on the other hand, the specification territory spatially concentrates participants with 
complementary skills and activities, for example around a production-related 
problem. One can speak of a specification territory when the territorial productive 
organisation, thanks to the relationships between local participants, has the 
collective capacity to bring to light and to resolve a production-related problem 
(among other things to generate a new technology). This capacity allows the territory 
to open up to a multiplicity of technical-productive pathways.  
  
In the center of a continuum describing the different forms of territories, certain authors 
distinguish the specialisation territory which concentrates participants belonging to the 
same industry and following very specialized development pathways in one type of industry. 
More precisely, for Colletis et al. (1999) specification may be observed in the capacity for 
change in the economic fabric when faced with a given productive problem. The concept of 
specification is used here to define the ability of the actors in a territory to identify new 
opportunities for development and to redeploy resources in relation to these opportunities. 
This supports some of the studies which explain the emergence and the operation of clusters 
(Suire, Vicente, 2009) or of those which deal with the territory as a provider of collective 
skills capable of resolving problems (Gilly, Torre, 2000). The specification territory is thus a 
territory made up of collective skills and relational combinations between actors forming its 
capacity for resilience  
  
2.2 Territorial resilience: the collective skills of a specification territory   
Whereas organisational resilience operates within a single organisation, territorial resilience 
refers to specific capacities shared by geographically closely-related actors. There are three 
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of these capacities, which are equivalent to stages in the formation of a specification 
territory. We make three proposals concerning the nature of these capacities:  
- Proposal 3: territorial resilience is based on the collective capacity of the actors to 
materialise a common production-related problem, to share a common aim. When 
an actor possesses the skills to resolve a difficulty alone, we are still dealing with a 
case of organisational resilience. If the actors, considered individually, do not have 
this capacity for resolving the problem and see, by cooperating at the territorial level, 
the means to resolve a problem that is beyond them individually then the resilience 
becomes territorial. This may be considered as a reciprocal acceptance of the need 
for a collective response to a problem understood as being common to all concerned;   
- Proposial 4: because they have identified a common production-related problem, the 
actors within a territory are now able to reach compromises in order to harmonise 
their strategies within a local productive organisation. These compromises are based 
on the definition of a common timeframe, on the complementary skills and physical 
resources to be brought into play in order to resolve the problem, on the distribution 
of the results hoped for from the collaboration, on the concrete aspects of the forms 
of cooperation, etc. These compromises signify the establishment, by the actors, of a 
territorial system of governance which regulates collective action. The notion of 
territorial governance enlarges that of institutional proximity;  
- Proposal 5: the actors are then able to create common learning processes and thus 
to innovate. The existence of this capacity for collective learning, by organising a 
flexible approach to the combination and re-combination of complementary skills, 
allows the opening up of the territory to a multiplicity of development pathways. 
Here the specification aspect of the territory is essential because it is above all the 
complementary character of the skills and the capacity of the actors to develop 
relationships that allow the territory to be redeployed, by avoiding lock-in 
phenomena which are encountered, for example, by territories engaged in 
specialisation pathways (Colletis, 2010). Faced with new technical-production 
problem, the actors work together permanently to find new responses (technical, 
organisational and relational) and new forms of territorial governance and thus 
become part of a process of territorial resilience. They thus build a memory 
(technical, organisational and relational) shared between them and nourished by the 
memories of the participants in the interaction.  
It seems to us that it is the taking into account of these three capacities that can help to 
understand why, for example in the previously quoted case of Silicon Valley, firms were able 
to find new development prospects after the bursting of the Internet bubble, by investing 
in biotechnologies and cleantech as a source of new growth (Cooke, 2010). Work by Simmie 
and Martin (2010) supports this idea when they show that the resilience of the Cambridge 
region is due to the capacity demonstrated by the actors to recombine their blocks of 
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knowledge and skills in alignment with the emerging technological paradigms. In the same 
way, in the region of Toulouse, France, the work of Gilly et al. (2011) shows that pivot firms 
such as Liebherr and Thales play a central role in the regional dynamic and in its capacity for 
resilience.  
   
Finally, the specification territory really is a territory within which territorial resilience can be 
deployed: such a resilience is characterised by a triple capacity to materialise a common 
problem, to make compromises between the actors in the territory and to organise collective 
learning as an adaptive and creative response to an external change or shock in the 
competitive, market and technological conditions for the period under consideration.   
  
  
3. The key role of pivot firms: articulating organisational resilience and territorial 
resilience  
Within such a specification territory, the actors always occupy asymmetrical positions. 
Certain are dominant and constitute the key actors. Public or private, they play a 
determining role in the local technical-productive organisation but also in the development 
of the institutional references for the actors in the territory, foundations of territorial 
resilience. The key actor favours relationships between organisations (companies, research 
centres, universities, local authorities, etc.) particularly in terms of skills, in order to develop, 
collectively and permanently, the new technologies which are necessary for it. In this way it 
plays a determining role in the stabilisation of the rules of the game of the actors or in the 
emergence of a new form of territorial governance.   
In our view, the key actor could just as well be an economic actor (company) as an 
institutional actor from the public (local authority) or private sector (association, trade 
union). We are now going to shed light on a new category of key actor, the pivot firm, which 
is tending to play a decisive and increasingly important role within certain specification 
territories.  
  
3.1 Pivot firms: an example of organisational resilience  
In numerous industrial or service activities, recent technological developments show a clear 
increase in the complexity of products and the incorporation of more and more complex 
and varied technologies (Catel, Monatéri, 2007). The multiplicity, the increasing complexity 
and the widening of the field of productive activities make it difficult for a single company 
to master all the functions related to technological innovation and development activities. 
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Consequently a cognitive division of the work has progressively become established based 
on the skills of the participants in the productive project. “The production process is broken 
down into homogeneous blocks of know-how. As a first approximation, a block of know-how 
may be defined as a set of knowledge referring to the same body of scientific and technical 
principles, subject to a common dynamic of evolution and transformation” (Moati, 
Mouhoud, 1994, p. 54). If this is the case, one can characterise a technical object as a 
combination of differentiated blocks of knowledge. Consequently, at least two types of skill 
appear: those relating to the mastery of the  
“scientific and technical principles” associated with each block of knowledge and those 
relating to the combination of these blocks to make the final product. These combinatory 
skills relate to the manner in which the components and subsets are integrated and linked 
together into a coherent whole (Henderson, Clark, 1990).  
Numerous studies have thus shown that these mutations have been at the origin of new 
organisational architectures, whether one considers the intra-company or inter-company 
level (Baldwin, Clark, 2000; Langlois, 2002; Sturgeon, 2002). Others deal more specifically 
with the structuring of the network and the role played by certain actors in these new 
architectures. The terminology to describe this group of actors is multiplying. “Hub firms” 
(Jarillo, 1988), called “pivot firms” par Guilhon and Gianfaldoni (1990) or “brokers” by Miles 
and Snow (1992), and Dhanasai and Parkhe (2006) are in a position to control the network 
of subcontractors. Strategic network analyses have developed the idea that the core of a 
network or “pivot firm” plays an essential role in these new architectures (Fréry, 1998). 
These pivot firms are in a position to control the network (Jarillo, 1988). Guilhon and 
Gianfaldoni (1990) underline the fact that the network of companies is organised around a 
“pivot firm”, referred to as a “broker” by Miles and Snow, (1992), as “focal firms” by Lorenzi 
and Baden-Fuller (1995), “flagship firms” by Rugman and D’Cruz (2000) or “network 
orchestrators” by Dhanasai and Parkhe (2006). This coordinating company must “manage a 
value chain” (Fulconis, Paché, 2005), exercise “local leadership” over part of the supply 
chain, particularly through project management (Fabbe-Costes, 2005). The focal-point 
company, by controlling the flow of information and by management of the various 
communication tools (Lorenzi, Baden-Fuller, 1995), organises the specialisation of the 
members of a network in the sense of an asymmetry of power and of roles (De Propis, 2001). 
For these authors, the focal-point firm becomes the designer of the network. Certain 
authors have described the skills possessed by pivot firms in order to play their role. Fréry 
(1998) stresses their ability to conceive the design of the value chain, to run it, to deal with 
conflicts and to evaluate the members of the chain, while other authors see their role as 
that of technical and organisational coordinator of the participants in a production-related 
project (Kechidi, 2008; Cagli, Kechidi, Levy, 2009; Gilly, Talbot, Zuliani, 2011).   
The re-centring of a company on know-how which is essential to its job is a response to the 
increasing complexity of technologies at the same time as its ability to (re)combine the skills 
  13  
held by other actors. Specifically, we develop the point of view according to which the 
emergence of a particular organisational form, the pivot firm, constitutes such a response 
to current mutations in productive processes. Responsible for the design and/or production 
of a subset of the final product and the technical and organisational interfaces with the 
other actors making up the production chain, the pivot firm shows the ability to develop 
and manage interactions with the other participants in the productive project.  
In order to put this ability into practice, the pivot firm possesses several essential skills.  
First it possesses specific technical skills which can be brought into play for the design and 
production of a major element of the production process. Possessing a homogeneous block 
of knowledge, it can play the role, at its level, of architect for the elements which are 
entrusted to it. In order to do this, it possesses combinatory, technical, organisational and 
relational skills. These skills are brought into play at the moment when the technical 
modules, previously broken down into subunits, are reassembled and in terms of the 
coordination of the actors which take part in this reconstitution. They indicate the ability to 
mediate between the architect company at the top of the pyramid which designs and 
assembles the complex product and the other actors spread over different levels which 
supply components and subsystems. In order to carry out this role of mediation, the pivot 
firm develops modes of governance.  
Pivot firms are generally firms from a particular industry which are very specialised. For 
example in the aeronautical field (Kechidi, 2013; Talbot, 2013), the construction of an 
aircraft is carried out under the responsibility of an architect-integrator of aeronautical 
systems (Airbus or Boeing), by a small number of pivot firms which are very specialised in a 
particular block of knowledge (Thales, Goodrich, Honeywell Liehberr, Rockwell, Vought, 
Alenia, etc.) and a whole network of small and medium-sized companies which are highly 
diversified and geographically close together. Other work of the same nature has been 
carried out previously in the automobile industry (Guilhon and Gianfaldoni, 1990).   
Finally, the pivot firm, faced with increasing complexity and intensification of the fields of 
knowledge that it must be able to bring into play in order to maintain its place in the supply 
chain, faced with the necessity of taking charge of the design and development of bigger 
and bigger systems, is an example of organisational resilience. The pivot firm has been able 
to develop the know-how and the modes of governance necessary for its adaptation. When 
this process of adaptation is carried out in association with actors who are geographically 
close, it participates in the development of territorial resilience. In this sense, it articulates 
organisational and territorial resilience.  
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3.2 The pivot firm and the development of territorial resilience  
In its technical-productive dimension, the combinatory capacity of the pivot firm expresses 
itself by its cooperation with other companies (industrial and service), research bodies 
(public and private) and institutions. When these relationships develop in a localised 
geographical area, they can help to construct a specification territory. In this configuration, 
beyond its capacity to combine products and/or technologies and to coordinate the local 
actors which produce them, the pivot firm, in its most highlydeveloped form, represents an 
organisational structure which facilitates the circulation and above all production of 
knowledge, know-how and technologies at the territorial level.   
In such a territory, the pivot firm is not the only actor to organise such cooperation. The 
presence of intermediary structures (often set up by local public institutions) facilitates the 
meeting of the pivot firm with local actors (research centres, networks of SMEs, etc.). These 
structures participate both in the codification and the development of the shared rules and 
common values which make up institutional proximity (and, beyond that, territorial 
governance) and in the development of organisational proximity. The   pivot firm becomes 
a key actor in the territory inasmuch as it lies both at the heart of the dynamic of local 
technical-productive organisation (organisational proximity) and at the centre of the 
institutional references (institutional proximity) which orientate the behaviour of local 
actors. Thanks to its combinatory skills it generates territorial resilience in its organisational 
and institutional dimensions.  
In fact, pivot firms show a capacity to take part in the structuring of a territory through dense 
networks of partner firms and research centres able to supply specific skills. Such a process, 
indicative of a specification territory, generates innovations which enrich both the technical 
and organisational skills of the pivot firms and the process of territorial resilience based on 
collective learning by the actors as well as on the development of compromises and 
common institutional references.  
  
Conclusion  
Finally we obtain two theoretical results in this essentially conceptual study. The first 
contribution consists of identifying two categories of external events triggering a process of 
resilience: certainly crises of a radical nature, but also profound productive and technological 
developments of a more incremental nature. On the basis of an approach considering 
resilience as a set of capacities (based themselves on skills specific to the actors), we have 
defined organisational resilience as: first, a reactive capacity of the company to resist an 
external event; second, a more active capacity to anticipate events and thus open new 
development pathways. This organisational resilience is based on the cognitive capital 
possessed by the firm and the specificity of its modes of governance (intra- and inter-
organisational).  
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The second theoretical contribution of this paper is that we propose a definition of resilience 
which takes into account simultaneously the organisational and territorial dimensions. It is 
true that organisational resilience may seek to make up for a lack of knowledge by opening 
up towards new forms of cooperation, for example on the basis of a territory. In fact, the 
positive effects of geographical proximity (increased possibility of face-to-face meetings, 
reduction in opportunistic behaviour) will favour exchanges and the recombination of know-
how which are necessary to the development of cognitive capital.  
It is this dynamic which is the basis of territorial resilience. Territorial resilience includes three 
collective capacities of the actors: first, materialise a common problem; second, make 
compromises in order to harmonise their strategies; third, organise a joint learning process in 
order to innovate.   
The pivot firm is a key actor able to link these two types of resilience, internal and external 
to the organisation. In effect it stands apart thanks to its capacity to manage the interfaces 
between industrial organisation and territorial creation of technologies. The pivot firm 
proves to be capable of both:  
- fitting into a process of innovation and creation of territorial resources issuing from 
the interplay of localised relationships established with strategic partners, 
innovative SMEs, research centres, etc.;  
- linking this territorial process with a double process: on the one hand, a 
technological process which is internal to the company and, on the other hand, a 
co-specification process with strategic partners.  
  
In the same way, the pivot firm appears as a company linking industrial dynamics and 
territorial dynamics and thus participating in the sectorial reorganisations currently taking 
place.   
Finally, this conceptual paper has allowed us to formulate a set of theoretical proposals 
which call for in-depth empirical validation. Fieldwork is indispensable in order to test them. 
Beyond the aeronautical industry, already referred to in this study, the automobile industry, 
for example, is no doubt a field of investigation to be pursued in future work  both because 
it is undergoing a major crisis and because it includes numerous locallybased pivot firms.  
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